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Although
the gold standard could hardly be portrayed as
having produced a period of price tranquility, it
was the case that the price level in 1929 was not
much different, on net, from what it had been in
1800. But, in the two decades following the
abandonment of the gold standard in 1933, the
consumer price index in the United States nearly
doubled. And, in the four decades after that,
prices quintupled. Monetary policy, unleashed from
the constraint of domestic gold convertibility,
had allowed a persistent overissuance of money. As
recently as a decade ago, central bankers, having
witnessed more than a half-century of chronic
inflation, appeared to confirm that a fiat
currency was inherently subject to excess.
But
the adverse consequences of excessive money growth
for financial stability and economic performance
provoked a backlash. Central banks were finally
pressed to rein in overissuance of money even at
the cost of considerable temporary economic
disruption. By 1979, the need for drastic measures
had become painfully evident in the United States.
The Federal Reserve, under the leadership of Paul
Volcker and with the support of both the Carter
and the Reagan Administrations, dramatically
slowed the growth of money. Initially, the economy
fell into recession and inflation receded.
However, most important, when activity staged a
vigorous recovery, the progress made in reducing
inflation was largely preserved. By the end of the
1980s, the inflation climate was being altered
dramatically.
The
record of the past twenty years appears to
underscore the observation that, although
pressures for excess issuance of fiat money are
chronic, a prudent monetary policy maintained over
a protracted period can contain the forces of
inflation. With the story of most major economies
in the postwar period being the emergence of, and
then battle against inflation, concerns about deflation,
one of the banes of an earlier century, seldom
surfaced. The recent experience of Japan has
certainly refocused attention on the possibility
that an unanticipated fall in the general price
level would convert the otherwise relatively
manageable level of nominal debt held by
households and businesses into a corrosive rising
level of real debt and real debt service costs. It
now appears that we have learned that deflation,
as well as inflation, are in the long run monetary
phenomena, to extend Milton Friedman's famous
dictum.
To
be sure, in the short to medium run, many forces
are at play that complicate the link between money
and prices. The widening globalization of market
economies in recent years, for example, is
integrating a growing share of previously local
capacity into an operationally meaningful world
total. That process has, at least for a time,
brought substantial new supplies of goods and
services to global markets. In addition, the more
rapid rate of technological innovation, so evident
in the United States, has boosted the pace at
which our productive potential is expanding. These
shifts in aggregate supply--whether foreign or
domestic in origin--influence the relationship
between money and prices. Moreover, the tie
between money and prices can be altered by
dysfunctional financial intermediation, as we have
witnessed in Japan. Thus, recent experience
understandably has stimulated policymakers
worldwide to refocus on deflation and its
consequences, decades after dismissing it as a
possibility so remote that it no longer warranted
serious attention.
The
meaning of deflation and the characteristics that
differentiate it from the more usual experience of
inflation are subjects being actively studied
inside and outside of central banks. As I
testified before the Congress last month, the
United States is nowhere close to sliding into a
pernicious deflation. Moreover, a major objective
of the recent heightened level of scrutiny is to
ensure that any latent deflationary pressures are
appropriately addressed well before they became a
problem.
*
* * * *
Central
bankers have long believed that price stability
is conducive to achieving maximum sustainable
growth. Historically, debilitating risk premiums
have tended to rise with both expected inflation
and deflation, and they have been minimized during
conditions of approximate price stability.
Although
the U.S. economy has largely escaped any deflation
since World War II, there are some well-founded
reasons to presume that deflation is more of a
threat to economic growth than is inflation. For
one, the lower bound on nominal interest rates at
zero threatens ever-rising real rates if deflation
intensifies. A related consequence is that even if
debtors are able to refinance loans at zero
nominal interest rates, they may still face high
and rising real rates that cause their balance
sheets to deteriorate.
Another
concern about deflation resides in labor markets.
Some studies have suggested that nominal wages do
not easily adjust downward. If lower price
inflation is accompanied by lower average wage
inflation, then the prevalence of nominal wages
being constrained from falling could increase as
price inflation moves toward or below zero. In
these circumstances, the effective clearing of
labor markets would be inhibited, with the
consequence being higher rates of unemployment.
Taken
together, these considerations suggest that
deflation could well be more damaging than
inflation to economic growth. While this asymmetry
should not be overlooked, several factors limit
its significance. In particular, more rapid
advances in productivity can make this asymmetry
less severe. Fast growth of productivity, by
buoying expectations of future advances of wages
and earnings and thus aggregate demand, enables
real interest rates to be higher than would
otherwise be the case without restricting economic
growth. Moreover, to the extent that more-rapid
growth of productivity shows through to faster
gains in nominal wages, there will be fewer
instances in which nominal wages will be pressured
to fall.
One
also should not overstate the difficulties posed
for monetary policy by the zero bound on interest
rates and nominal wage inflexibility even in the
absence of faster productivity growth. The
expansion of the monetary base can proceed even if
overnight rates are driven to their zero lower
bound. The Federal Reserve has authority to
purchase Treasury securities of any maturity and
indeed already purchases such securities as part
of its procedures to keep the overnight rate at
its desired level. This authority could be used to
lower interest rates at longer maturities. Such
actions have precedent: Between 1942 and 1951, the
Federal Reserve put a ceiling on longer-term
Treasury yields at 2-1/2 percent. With respect to
potential difficulties in labor markets, results
from research remain ambiguous on the extent and
persistence of downward rigidity in nominal
compensation.
Clearly,
it would be desirable to avoid deflation. But if
deflation were to develop, options for an
aggressive monetary policy response are available.
*
* * * *
Fortunately,
the ability of our economy to weather the many
shocks inflicted on it since the spring of 2000
attests to our market system's remarkable
resilience. That characteristic is far more
evident today than two or three decades ago. There
may be numerous causes of this increased
resilience.1
Among them, ongoing efforts to liberalize global
trade have added flexibility to many aspects of
our economy over time. Furthermore, a
quarter-century of bipartisan deregulation has
significantly reduced inflexibilities in our
markets for energy, transportation, communication,
and financial services. And, of course, the
dramatic gains in information technology have
markedly improved the ability of businesses to
address festering economic imbalances before they
inflict significant damage. This improved ability
has been further facilitated by the increasing
willingness of our workers to embrace innovation
more generally. Irrespective of how deflationary
forces might influence it, our economy has the
benefit of enhanced flexibility, which has, at
least to date, allowed us to withstand the
potentially destabilizing effects of some
substantial negative shocks.
*
* * * *
Certainly,
lurking in the background of any evaluation of
deflation risks is the concern that those forces
could be unleashed by a bursting bubble in asset
prices. This connection, real or speculative,
raises some interesting questions about the most
effective approach to the conduct of monetary
policy. If the bursting of an asset bubble creates
economic dislocation, then preventing bubbles
might seem an attractive goal. But whether
incipient bubbles can be detected in real time and
whether, once detected, they can be defused
without inadvertently precipitating still greater
adverse consequences for the economy remain in
doubt.
It
may be useful, as a first step, to consider both
the economic circumstances most likely to impede
the development of bubbles and the circumstances
most conducive to their formation. Destabilizing
macroeconomic policies and poor economic
performance are not likely to provide fertile
ground for the optimism that usually accompanies
surging asset prices.
Ironically,
low inflation, economic stability, and low risk
premiums may provide tinder for asset price
speculation that could be sparked should
technological innovations open up new
opportunities for profitable investment. Even in
such circumstances, bubble pricing is likely to be
inhibited for a company with a history. To be
sure, the stock prices of old-line companies do
rise somewhat through arbitrage when the market as
a whole is propelled higher by stock prices of
cutting-edge technologies. But it is difficult to
imagine stock prices of most well-established and
seasoned old-line companies surging to wholly
unsustainable heights. With some prominent
exceptions, their capabilities for future profits
have been largely tested and delimited.
The
situation is likely different in the case of a new
company that employs an innovative technology.
Under these circumstances, the dispersion of
rationally imagined possible future outcomes could
be wide. If forecasts are unfettered by a need for
consistency with the past, investors might take
off on unwarranted flights of optimism. Moreover,
skeptics find it too expensive or too risky to
short sell the shares of such a company,
especially when its stock price is rising rapidly.
The
conditions of extended low inflation and low risk
were combined with breakthrough technologies to
produce the bubble of recent years. But do such
conditions always produce a bubble? It seems
improbable that a surge in innovation in the near
future would generate a new bubble of substantial
proportions. Investors are likely to be sensitive
to the need for asset prices to be backed
ultimately by an ongoing stream of earnings.
Hence, a further necessary condition for the
emergence of a bubble is the passage of sufficient
time to erode the traumatic memories of earlier
post-bubble experiences.
*
* * * *
Most
standard macroeconomic models fitted to the
experience of recent decades imply that a
distortion in valuation ratios induced by a bubble
can be offset by adopting a sufficiently
restrictive monetary policy. According to such
models, a tighter monetary policy, on average,
credibly constrains demand and lowers asset
prices, all else being equal. These models can
also be interpreted to suggest that incremental
monetary tightening can gradually deflate stock
prices. But that conclusion is a consequence of
the model's construction. It is not based on
evidence drawn from history. In fact, history
indicates that bubbles tend to deflate not
gradually and linearly but suddenly,
unpredictably, and often violently. In addition,
the degree of monetary tightening that would be
required to contain or offset a bubble of any
substantial dimension appears to be so great as to
risk an unacceptable amount of collateral damage
to the wider economy.
The
evidence of recent years, as well as the events of
the late 1920s, casts doubt on the proposition
that bubbles can be defused gradually. As I
related this summer at the annual Jackson Hole
symposium sponsored by the Kansas City Federal
Reserve Bank, "...our experience over the
past fifteen years suggests that monetary
tightening that deflates stock prices without
depressing economic activity has often been
associated with subsequent increases in
the level of stock prices....Such data suggest
that nothing short of a sharp increase in
short-term rates that engenders a significant
economic retrenchment is sufficient to check a
nascent bubble. The notion that a well-timed
incremental tightening could have been calibrated
to prevent the late 1990s bubble is almost surely
illusion."2
In
short, unless a model can be specified to capture
the apparent market tendency toward bidding stock
prices higher in response to monetary policies
aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability, the
accompanying forecasts will belie recent
experience. Faced with this uncertainty, the
Federal Reserve has focused on policies that
would, as I testified before the Congress in 1999,
"...mitigate the fallout [of an asset bubble]
when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition
to the next expansion."3
The Federal Open Market Committee chose, as you
know, to embark on an aggressive course of
monetary easing two years ago once it became
apparent that a variety of forces, including
importantly the slump in household wealth that
resulted from the decline in stock prices, were
restraining inflation pressures and economic
activity.
It
is too soon to judge the final outcome of the
strategy that we adopted. The contractionary
impulse from the decline in equity prices appeared
to be diminishing around the middle of this year.
But then the fallout for stock prices from
corporate governance malfeasance, argued by some
as having been spawned by the bubble, became more
intense. This, in turn, damped capital investment
and trimmed inventory plans. More recently, of
course, geopolitical risk has risen markedly,
further weighing on demand. Though unrelated to
the bubble burst of 2000, it has muddied the
evaluation of the post-bubble economy.
If
the postmortem of recent monetary policy shows
that the results of addressing the bubble only
after it bursts are unsatisfactory, we would be
left with less-appealing choices for the future.
In that case, finding ways to identify bubbles and
to contain their progress would be desirable,
though history cautions that prospects for success
appear slim.
The
difficulties that policymakers and private agents
face become especially acute as an economic
expansion lengthens. The decline in risk premiums
under these circumstances presumably results, in
part, from rational appraisals. In an economy in
which the business cycle has averaged four years
in length over a protracted period, households and
businesses would doubtless become more cautious in
the fourth year of a new cycle. But how do they
behave when, as for the past two decades,
expansions have been long and cyclical downturns
have been exceptionally rare? After five or six
years of uninterrupted expansion, is it irrational
or even unreasonable to assume that expansion
would continue for the subsequent six months?
Thus, it was disturbing to observe risk seemingly
being priced so cheaply in late 1997 when BBB
corporate spreads over ten-year Treasuries sunk to
only 70 basis points. That spread is now about 250
basis points, although it has narrowed
significantly in recent weeks.
*
* * * *
Weaving
a monetary policy path through the thickets of
bubbles and deflations and their possible
aftermath is not something with which modern
central bankers have had much experience.
As
I noted earlier, it seems ironic that a monetary
policy that is successful in inducing stability
may inadvertently be sowing the seeds of
instability associated with asset bubbles. I trust
that the use by the central bank of deliberately
inflationary policy as protection against bubbles
can be readily dismissed. While the current
episode has not yet concluded, it appears that,
responding vigorously in a relatively flexible
economy to the aftermath of bubbles, as traumatic
as that may be, is less inhibiting to long-term
growth than chronic high-inflation monetary
policy. Moderate inflation might possibly inhibit
bubbles, though at some cost of reduced economic
efficiency. However, I doubt that such policies
could be sustained or well-controlled by central
banks. Among our realistically limited
alternatives, dealing aggressively with the
aftermath of a bubble appears the most likely to
avert long-term damage to the economy.4
Regardless
of history's verdict on a policy that addresses
only the aftermath of bubbles, we still need to
improve our understanding of the dynamics of
bubbles and deflation to contain the latter, if
not the former.
*
* * * *
Before
closing this evening, I would like to take a few
minutes to address recent economic developments.
As
I pointed out earlier, the U.S. economy exhibited
considerable resilience to a series of post-boom
shocks. The list is rather impressive: First, a
halving of stock prices and household equity
wealth; second, a dramatic decline in capital
expenditures; third, the tragic events of
September 11; fourth, the disturbing evidence of
corporate malfeasance; and fifth, the recent
escalation of geopolitical risks. I would scarcely
state that our economy was not shaken by these
series of shocks, one on top of the other. But
after we experienced a mild recession, real GDP
grew in excess of 3 percent over the year ending
in the third quarter.
The
recovery, however, ran into resistance in the
summer, apparently as a consequence of a renewed
weakening in equity prices, further revelations of
corporate malfeasance, and then the heightened
geopolitical risks. Concern on our part led the
Federal Open Market Committee to reduce its
targeted federal funds rate 50 basis points at our
early November meeting as some insurance against
the possibility that the weakening would gain some
footing. Although our most probable forecast
already was that growth would pick up, we judged
the cost of the insurance provided by additional
easing as exceptionally modest because we viewed
the risk of an imminent rise in inflation as
remote.
The
limited evidence since the November easing has
supported our view that the U.S. economy has been
working its way through a soft patch. And the
patch has certainly been soft. The labor market
has remained subdued, as businesses apparently
have been reluctant to add to payrolls. The
manufacturing sector remains especially damped,
and nonresidential construction has trended lower.
By all reports, state and local governments
continue to struggle with deterioration in their
fiscal conditions. Oil prices have recently risen
and, not least, the economies of most of our major
trading partners have shown little vigor.
Still,
low interest rates and rapid advances in
productivity have been providing considerable
support to economic activity. Those influences
have been most evident on consumer spending and
new home sales, which have been remarkably firm
this year. Motor vehicle sales have been supported
by low financing costs, by high levels of customer
incentives, and by high rates of vehicle scrappage
and multiple car ownership. More broadly, strong
growth of labor productivity, supplemented by
reduced tax payments, has provided a boost both to
incomes and to spending. Meanwhile, new home sales
have been buoyed by low mortgage interest rates as
well as favorable demographics.
Cash
borrowed in the process of mortgage refinancing,
an important support for consumer outlays this
past year, is bound to contract at some point, as
average interest rates on households' total
mortgage portfolio converges to interest rates on
new mortgages. However, applications for
refinancing, while off their peaks, remain high.
Moreover, simply processing the backlog of earlier
applications will take some time, and this factor
alone suggests continued significant refinancing
originations and cash-outs into the early months
of 2003.
Corporate
risk-taking underwent pronounced retrenchment
following the traumatic disclosures of corporate
malfeasance this summer. Capital appropriations
slowed noticeably across a broad spectrum of
American industries. Aggressive accounting
practices seemingly disappeared virtually
overnight. I would not be surprised if further
disclosures of questionable practices were to
surface in the months ahead, but I would be quite
surprised if such practices were introduced after
mid-2002.
Since
early October, conditions in financial markets
have turned less adverse. Stock prices have, on
net, moved up, and corporate yield spreads,
especially for below-investment-grade debt
instruments, have narrowed significantly. Those
spreads, nevertheless, remain quite elevated
relative to their readings of early 2000. Credit
derivative default swaps have improved recently in
line with yield spreads. The overall cost of
business capital has clearly declined, inducing in
recent weeks increased issuance of bonds of all
grades and halting the runoff of commercial paper
and business bank loans.
The
recent increase in the expansion of business
credit may hint at some stirring in capital
investment, but it is simply too early to tell.
There is evidence that some corporate managers are
beginning to tentatively venture out on the risk
scale. New orders for capital goods equipment and
software, after falling sharply over the preceding
two years, have stabilized and in some cases
turned up in nominal terms this year--an
improvement, to be sure, but not necessarily the
beginnings of a vigorous recovery.
In
the end, capital investment will be most dependent
on the outlook for profits and the resolution of
the uncertainties surrounding the business outlook
and the geopolitical situation. These
considerations at present impose a rather
formidable barrier to new investment. Profit
margins have been running a little higher this
year than last, aided importantly by strong growth
in labor productivity. But a lack of pricing power
remains evident for most corporations. A more
vigorous and broad-based pickup in capital
spending will almost surely require further gains
in corporate profits and cash flows.
A
full enumeration of the caveats surrounding the
economic outlook would, as usual, be lengthy. But
often-cited concerns about the levels of debt and
debt-servicing costs of households and firms
appear a bit stretched. The combination of
household mortgage and consumer debt as a share of
disposable income has moved up to a historically
high level. But the upward trend in the series
reflects, in part, financial innovations that have
increased access to credit markets for many
households. These innovations include the
development of a deep secondary market for home
mortgages, along with the advent of credit scoring
and automated underwriting models that have
enhanced the ability of loan officers and credit
card companies to identify good credit risks.
These innovations lower the risk level of any
given amount of debt.
To
be sure, the mortgage debt of homeowners relative
to their income is high by historical norms. But,
as a consequence of low interest rates, the
servicing requirement for that debt relative to
homeowners' income is roughly in line with the
historical average. Moreover, owing to continued
large gains in residential real estate values,
equity in homes has continued to rise despite very
large debt-financed extractions. Adding in the
fixed costs associated with other financial
obligations, such as rental payments of tenants,
consumer installment credit, and auto leases, the
total servicing costs faced by households relative
to their income appears somewhat elevated compared
with longer-run averages. But arguably they are
not a significant cause for concern.
Some
strain from corporate debt burdens became evident
as rates of return on capital projects financed
with debt fell short of expectations over the past
several years. While overall debt has not been
paid down, corporations have significantly
increased holdings of cash and have reduced their
near-term debt obligations by issuing bonds to pay
down commercial paper and bank loans.
*
* * * *
In
early 2000, as financial imbalances and increased
risk brought the surge in capital investment to an
end, significant profitable opportunities remained
to be exploited. One must presume that they still
exist and may well have been enlarged by
subsequent technological advances. Indeed, one of
the most remarkable features of the performance of
the U.S. economy over the past year had been the
extraordinary gains in productivity. The increase
in output per hour over the year ending in the
third-quarter--5-1/2 percent--was the largest
increase in several decades. That pace will not
likely be sustained, but it suggests that the
underlying supports to productivity growth have
not yet fully played out. Against that background,
any significant fall in the current geopolitical
and other risks should noticeably improve capital
outlays, the indispensable spur to a path of
increased economic growth.
*
* * * *
In
summary, as we focus on the dangers of bubbles,
deflation, and excess capacity, the marked
improvement in the degree of flexibility and
resilience exhibited by our economy in recent
years should afford us considerable comfort for
now. Still, economic policymakers are having to
grapple with what seems to be a much larger
portfolio of problems than that which our
predecessors appeared to face a half-century ago.
The ever-growing complexity of our global economic
and financial system surely plays a role.
Moreover, the very technologies that have helped
us reap enormous efficiencies have also presented
us with new challenges by increasing our
interconnectedness.
I
venture that future invitees to the Economic Club
of New York dinners will not lack interesting
problems to address.
Footnotes
1.
A considerable economics literature in recent
years has documented a decline in the volatility
of real GDP over the past two decades. Some
researchers have argued that the decline in
volatility is the result of smaller disturbances
to the macroeconomy. Others have argued that
improved monetary policy should be credited for
the reduction. Another line of work points to
structural changes that have increased the
flexibility of the economy to respond to shocks.
In that vein, I have argued that advances in
information technology and the cumulative effects
of a quarter century of deregulation have likely
played a major role in promoting the increased
flexibility of our economy. Of course, these
explanations are not mutually exclusive and could,
indeed, be interconnected.
But
to the extent that this resilience reflects
increased flexibility of the economy, we should be
searching for policies that will further enhance
economic flexibility and dismantling policies that
contribute to unnecessary rigidity. The more
flexible an economy is, the greater is its ability
to self-correct to inevitable disturbances,
reducing the size and consequences of cyclical
imbalances. An implication is that, at any given
point in time, the economy is more likely to be
producing close to its productive potential. So
often, discussion of policies intended to improve
macroeconomic performance have focused solely on
traditional monetary and fiscal policies. But
structural policies intended to promote
flexibility may be an important complement to
standard macro policies, and they may be important
enough to influence both the cyclical performance
and long-run growth potential of the economy. This
issue surely deserves examination and debate. Return
to text
2.
Alan Greenspan, “Economic Volatility,” August
30, 2002, at a symposium sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Jackson Hole,
Wyoming. Return to text
3.
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S.
House of Representatives, July 22, 1999. Return
to text
4.
Some argue that bubbles can be prevented or
defused by financial regulatory initiatives. It is
observed that asset bubbles have often been
associated with rapid credit expansion, and hence
it is claimed that restraining credit growth could
quash nascent bubbles. A bubble could conceivably
be defused by restrictive credit regulations that
stifle economic growth. It is by no means clear,
however, that such a regime would be more
conducive to wealth creation over time than our
current regulatory system. Also of relevance, in a
vibrant financial system, such as exists in the
United States, there will always be many avenues
available to investors for financing a bubble.
Furthermore, many analysts maintain that stocks
are priced at the margin by institutions with
little or no financing needs. Return
to text
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