Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan
At the 2003 Financial Markets Conference of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia (via satellite)
April 4, 2003
Market Economies and Rule of Law
Market economies require a rule of law. A
society without state protection of individual rights,
especially the right to own property, would not build private
long term assets, a key ingredient of a growing modern
economy. Yet an excess of rules--in the extreme case, central
planning--has also been shown to stifle initiative and produce
economic stagnation.
Since its early stirrings in eighteenth
century Britain, modern economic development has been
characterized by an ebb and flow in the intensity of state
involvement in shaping the economic environment. According to
the legends of the early American West, the only law west of
the Pecos River was administered by Judge Bean. I am not sure
how much law that was, but I do know that much protection of
property in sparsely settled western communities just after
the Civil War had to be privately provided. Understandably,
trade was limited in such an environment. Economic growth was
greatly facilitated by the emergence of civil government,
which provided consistent and predictable enforcement of
property rights, among other things.
More recently, the states of the former
Soviet Union suffered for a while many of the alleged
characteristics of the American Wild West--legal chaos,
rampant criminality, and widespread corruption. This difficult
period of transition in the Soviet satellite countries
followed four decades of central planning in which excessive
government control of the economy resulted in massive economic
failure.
Of course, the chief economic affliction of
the Soviet bloc was not an excessive rule of law but rather
the arbitrary enforcement of an inefficient set of rules. With
few exceptions, the new leaders of these countries recognize
that future economic success will depend on an efficient and
predictable rule of law.
* * *
A tension has always existed between a
desired continuity in the laws and regulations governing trade
and business practices, and the necessary updating that is
required to keep pace with a growing and, hence, changing
economy. Uncertainties that stem from the arbitrary
enforcement of the body of prevailing rules are reflected in
higher risk and cost of capital which, in turn, inhibit
economic growth.
Implementing an effective rule of law,
however, has its own difficulties. One key component, a law of
contracts, governs the resolution of certain disputes between
parties. Yet if adjudication were requested for more than a
very small fraction of contracts, our court system would be
swamped into immobility and the performance of our economy
would suffer. Thus, if our market system is to function
smoothly, the vast majority of trades must rest on mutual
trust and only indirectly on the law.
A more general concern is that laws can
never be fixed in perpetuity. As societies and economies
evolve, the details of the law, though generally not its
fundamental principles, need to change. But any uncertainty
about the clarity and fixity of the law adds to the risk of
trade, which as I noted, is reflected in a higher real cost of
capital.
We in the United States endeavored to lessen
legal uncertainty by embedding our most fundamental principles
in a constitution, which we made difficult to amend. The
commercially and economically salient specifics are typically
expressed in federal or state statutes. In general, this
arrangement seems to have provided us with a healthy balance
of continuity and predictability and, yet, also the requisite
flexibility to respond to evolving economic and societal
circumstances.
* * *
Reflecting that flexibility, the direction
and the emphasis of legislative revision over the generations
have mirrored the changing structure of our economy. In recent
decades, for example, the fraction of the total output of our
economy that is essentially conceptual rather than physical
has been rising. This trend has, of necessity, shifted the
emphasis in asset valuation from physical property to
intellectual property and to the legal rights that inhere in
the latter. Though the shift may appear glacial, its impact on
legal and economic risk is only beginning to be felt.
Over the past half century, the increase in
the value of raw materials has accounted for only a fraction
of the overall growth of U.S. gross domestic product. The rest
of that growth reflects the embodiment of ideas in products
and services that consumers value. This shift of emphasis from
physical materials to ideas as the core of value creation
appears to have accelerated in recent decades.
Technological advance is continually
altering the shape and nature of our economic processes and,
in particular, is promoting the trend toward increasing
conceptualization of U.S. GDP. The size of our radios, for
example, has been dramatically reduced by the substitution of
transistors for vacuum tubes. Thin fiber optic cable has
replaced huge tonnages of copper wire. New architectural,
engineering, and materials technologies have enabled the
construction of buildings enclosing the same space with far
less physical material than was required, say, 50 or 100 years
ago. More recently, mobile phones have markedly downsized as
they have improved. The movement over the decades toward
production of services requiring little physical input has
also been a major contributor to the dramatic rise in the
ratio of constant dollars of GDP per ton of input.
This dramatic shift toward product
downsizing during the past half century stems from several
causes. The challenge of accumulating physical goods and
moving them in an ever more crowded geographical environment
has clearly resulted in cost pressures to economize on size
and space. Similarly, the prospect of increasing costs of
discovering, developing, and processing ever larger quantities
of physical resources has shifted producers toward downsized
alternatives. Remember that dire concerns about the prospects
of running out of the physical resources that allegedly were
necessary to support our standards of living were reflected in
a report from the Club of Rome three decades ago. Another
cause of product downsizing is that, as we moved the
technological frontier forward and pressed for information
processing to speed up, the laws of physics required the
relevant microchips to become ever more compact.
More generally, in the physical world, the
usual situation is that each additional unit of output is more
costly to produce than the previous one; that is, production,
at least eventually, is characterized by increasing marginal
cost. By contrast, in the conceptual world, much of production
is characterized by constant, and perhaps even zero, marginal
cost.
For example, though the set up cost of
creating an on-line encyclopedia may be enormous, the cost of
reproduction and distribution may be near zero if the means of
distribution is the Internet. The emergence of an electronic
platform for the transmission of ideas at negligible marginal
cost may therefore be an important factor explaining the
recent increased conceptualization of the GDP. The demand for
conceptual products is clearly impeded to a much smaller
degree by rising marginal cost than is the demand for physical
products.
But regardless of its causes,
conceptualization is irreversibly increasing the emphasis on
the protection of intellectual, relative to physical, property
rights. Before World War I, markets in this country were
essentially uninhibited by government regulations, but they
were supported by rights to property, which in those years
meant largely physical property. Intellectual
property--patents, copyrights, and trademarks--represented a
far less important component of the economy, which was mainly
agricultural. One of the most significant inventions of the
nineteenth century was the cotton gin. Perhaps it was a
harbinger of things to come that the intellectual property
content of the cotton gin was never effectively protected from
copiers.
Only in recent decades, as the economic
product of the United States has become so predominantly
conceptual, have issues related to the protection of
intellectual property rights come to be seen as significant
sources of legal and business uncertainty. Intellectual
property is clearly more difficult to define and, hence, to
protect. The physical property of one owner cannot occupy the
same space as that of another. Ownership of physical property
is capable of being defended by police, the militia, or
private mercenaries. Ownership of ideas is far less easily
protected.
Indeed, the nature of intellectual property
is importantly different from physical property. In
particular, one individual's use of an idea does not make that
idea unavailable to others for their own, simultaneous use.
Furthermore, new ideas almost invariably build on old ideas in
ways that are difficult or impossible to delineate. From an
economic perspective, this provides a rationale for making the
calculus, developed initially by Leibnitz and Newton, freely
available, despite the fact that those insights have
immeasurably increased wealth over the generations. Should we
have protected their claim in the same way that we do for
owners of land? Or should the law make their insights more
freely available to those who would build on them, with the
aim of maximizing the wealth of the society as a whole? Are
all property rights inalienable, or must they conform to a
reality that conditions them?
These questions bedevil economists and
jurists, for they touch on some fundamental principles
governing the organization of a modern economy and, hence, its
society. Whether we protect intellectual property as an
inalienable right or as a privilege vouchsafed by the
sovereign, such protection inevitably entails making some
choices that have crucial implications for the balance we
strike between the interests of those who innovate and those
who would benefit from innovation.
In the case of physical property, we take it
for granted that the ownership right should have the potential
of persisting as long as the physical object itself. In the
case of an idea, however, we have chosen to strike a different
balance in recognition of the chaos that could follow from
having to trace back all the thoughts implicit in one's
current undertaking and pay a royalty to the originator of
each one. So rather than adopting that obviously principled
but unworkable approach, we have chosen instead to follow the
lead of British common law and place time limits on
intellectual property rights.
It is, thus, no surprise that, as a result
of the increasing conceptualization of our GDP over the
decades, the protection of intellectual property has become an
important element in the ongoing deliberations of both
economists and jurists.
Of particular current relevance to our
economy overall is the application of property right
protection to information technology. A noticeable component
of the surge in the trend growth of the economy in recent
years arguably reflects the synergy of laser and fiber optic
technologies in the 1960s and 1970s. This synergy has produced
very little that is tangible in information technology. Yet
the information flow that it facilitates has allowed the
creation of vast amounts of wealth.
The dramatic gains in information technology
have markedly improved the ability of businesses to identify
and address incipient economic imbalances before they inflict
significant damage. These gains reflect new advances in both
the physical and the conceptual realms. It is imperative to
find the appropriate intellectual property regime for each.
* * *
If our objective is to maximize economic
growth, are we striking the right balance in our protection of
intellectual property rights? Are the protections sufficiently
broad to encourage innovation but not so broad as to shut down
follow-on innovation? Are such protections so vague that they
produce uncertainties that raise risk premiums and the cost of
capital? How appropriate is our current system--developed for
a world in which physical assets predominated--for an economy
in which value increasingly is embodied in ideas rather than
tangible capital?
If the form of protection afforded to
intellectual property rights affects economic growth, it must
do so by increasing the underlying pace of productivity
growth. The bulk of this increase should show up as
multifactor productivity, that is, the segment of labor
productivity that reflects the impact of
conceptualization--ideas generally--on economic growth and
standards of living. Finding a way to isolate the effect of,
say, the length of patents on overall economic growth poses a
formidable challenge.
The more general challenge is to develop a
framework that fosters the growth of an economy increasingly
dominated by conceptual products. The focus of this conference
therefore is timely and apt.
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